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Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution empowers
Congress "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."' Often referred
to colloquially as the intellectual property clause, this portion of the
Constitution explicitly specifies the means through which Congress
may achieve its goal. It is no surprise, then, that the passage of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act in the fall of 2011 created uproar
in the legal community.
In particular, section 3 of the Act has received sharp criticism.
The root of this criticism stems from a change in the requirements for
patentability. Whereas the United States previously followed a so-
called first-to-invent scheme, the Act instead grants patent rights to
the first inventor to file.' According to the Act, Congress believed
that this conversion would "promote the progress of science and
useful arts by securing for limited times to inventors the exclusive
rights to their discoveries and provide inventors with greater certainty
regarding the scope of protection provided by the grant of exclusive
* Juris Doctor Candidate 2013 University of California, Hastings College of the
Law; B.A. 2008 University of California, Los Angeles. I would like to thank my family for
their support throughout the years. Mom, Dad, and Ed, I would not be able to do this
without you. I would also like to thank Professor Robin Feldman for introducing me to
the field of Intellectual Property, and Professor Douglas Lichtman for showing me how
patents can move the world forward. Lastly, I would like to thank Arpi for reminding me
of what's most important.
1. U.S. CONST. art. VIII, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Michael A. Glenn & Peter J. Nagle, Article I and the First Inventor to File: Patent
Reform or Doublespeak?, 50 IDEA 441, 441 (2009-10).
3. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 3 (2011).
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rights to their discoveries. " Additionally, the Act states that this
conversion "will promote harmonization of the United States' patent
system with the patent systems commonly used in nearly all other
countries throughout the world with whom the United States
conducts trade."5
Section 3 of the Leahy-Smith Act also amends the terms used in
section 100.' It adds statutory definitions for the following: inventor,
joint inventor, joint research agreement, effective filing date, and
claimed invention.' According to subsection (a), "the term 'inventor'
means the individual, or if a joint invention, the individuals
collectively who invented or discovered the subject matter of the
invention."' Additionally, the "terms 'joint inventor' and 'coinventor'
mean any one of the individuals who invented or discovered the
subject matter of a joint invention."' The Act also defines "effective
filing date" for a claimed invention as "the actual filing date of the
patent or the application for the patent containing a claim to the
invention."to
Within the context of the international community, the United
States was one of only a handful of nations to implement a first-to-
invent regime," Under this system, inventions in the United States
had two steps: "(1) conception of the invention and (2) reduction to
practice of the invention."12 Conception was defined as the point in
time when an inventor conceives of an invention and diligently
reduces it to practice." Examples of diligent pursuit include filing a
patent application and practicing the invention.14 Therefore, the first
conceiver is entitled to a patent, even if another inventor files an
application and reduces the invention to practice before the original
inventor, so long as the first conceiver diligently pursues his
4. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
5. 35 U.S.C. § 100.
6. Id.
7. 35 U.S.C. § 100(a).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 100(f).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 100(g).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 100(i)(1).
11. Michael F. Martin, The End of the First-to-Invent Rule: A Concise History of its
Origin, 49 IDEA 435,439 n.16 (2009).
12. Korbinian Kopf, Establishing Priority of Invention in the USA, KLUWER PATENT
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invention." Those who filed first were assumed to have a prima facie
right to the invention, but that presumption was rebuttable." In such
instances where the first conceiver filed later, "the first conceiver
would have to bring interference proceedings against the second to
prove that they were the true inventor."" Based on the
determination of the Unites States Patent and Trademark Office
("USPTO"), the patent will be granted to the original inventor
accordingly."
Section 135 of the Leahy-Smith Act also sets forth a derivation
proceeding to ensure that the first to file is an original inventor and
did not derive his invention from another inventor:
An applicant for patent may file a petition to institute
a derivation proceeding in the Office. The petition
shall set forth with particularity the basis for finding
that an inventor named in an earlier application
derived the claimed invention from an inventor named
in the petitioner's application and, without
authorization, the earlier application claiming such
invention was filed. Any such petition may only be
filed within 1 year after the first publication of a claim
to an invention that is the same or substantially the
same as the earlier application's claim to the invention,
shall be made under oath, and shall be supported with
substantial evidence."
This note will argue that the Leahy-Smith Act is constitutional
under the intellectual property clause. The alternative views
regarding the Act-namely those believed to be unconstitutional-
will be discussed, and the textual differences between the original
statute and the Act will be unpacked. The new first-inventor-to-file
regime will be examined within this context.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Richard Clement and Shelley Rowland, United States Switches from First-to-
Invent to First-Inventor-to-File System in 2013, JDSUPRA LAW NEWS (2013),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/united-states-switches-from-first-to-inv-86923/.
18. Id.
19. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (a).
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I. Alternative Views On the Constitutionality
of the Leahy-Smith Act
Legal scholarship has been published regarding the
constitutionality of the Leahy-Smith Act, contending that it is in
direct conflict with the intellectual property clause.20 Jonathan S.
Massey's article succinctly states scholars' primary concern regarding
its legitimacy:
Congress is authorized to make patents available only
to "inventors" and only for their "discoveries." At the
time of the Constitution's framing, the common
understanding of an "inventor" was the same as it is
today: "one who produces something new; a devisor of
something not known before," in the words of Samuel
Johnson's 1787 dictionary."
Moreover, he argues that, "[the] same dictionary defined
'discoverer' as 'one that finds anything unknown before.' Only the
first inventor can discover something 'not known before.' A second
'inventor' is an oxymoron; that person merely rediscovered that
which was already discovered by the first inventor."2 When the first
inventor makes a new discovery, the constitutional directives are not
held in suspension. Rather, the intellectual property clause secures
exclusive rights on the first and true inventor, and that
constitutionally recognized property cannot be divested by an earlier
USPTO filing by a different person. 3
Most importantly, Massey states that administrative expediency
cannot trump the Constitution." In looking at the intent of the
framers, early acts of Congress are often highly probative of
constitutional intent because of the fifty-five delegates at the
Convention, nineteen later served as Senators and thirteen as
Representatives. What Massey discovered was that the first patent
statutes strongly support the first-to-invent standard:
20. Jonathan S. Massey, Why First to File Is Unconstitutional, OHIOPATLEG,
http://ohiopatleg.wordpress.comlamerica-invents-act-is-unconstitutional/why-first-to-file-
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The Patent Act of 1790, enacted in the second session
of the First Congress ... provided for repeal of a
patent "if it shall appear that the patentee was not the
first and true inventor." The 1793 statute also
required that the applicant "swear or affirm that he
does verily believe, that he is the true inventor or
discoverer of the art, machine, or improvement, for
which he solicits a patent."2 1
In fact, Chief Justice John Marshall explained that the law
recognized a property right in the inventor "from the moment of
invention," which was "only perfected by the patent."26 Furthermore,
one of the Supreme Court's earliest patent opinions-Pennock v.
Dialogue-supports the assertion that under the Constitution, "the
right is created by the invention, and not by the patent."" In essence,
Massey's belief that the Act is unconstitutional stems from the
definition of inventor, and the critical points in time used to measure
said definition.
II. Substantive Differences Between the 1952 Act and the
Leahy-Smith Act
Under the United States' Patent Act of 1952, the invention date
had three key points: conception, reduction to practice, and filing.
Under the Leahy-Smith Act, this process is streamlined into two
stages: public disclosure and filing. 9 For example, if a second filer is
first to publicly disclose the invention, then that public disclosure
gives the second filer priority over the first filer.30 In this instance, the
new regime is not a pure first-inventor-to-file system because the first
inventor has a grace period that will allow him to obtain the patent
even if he is not first to file. This misnomer is relevant because
criticism regarding the Leahy-Smith Act's constitutionality focuses on
this incorrect labeling.
It is illustrative to look at the priority of invention more closely.
Under the new regime of the Leahy-Smith Act, the first applicant to
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 27 U.S. 1, 7 (1829) (emphasis in original).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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file will likely win patent protection. However, two key exceptions
exist.1 As mentioned previously, the first exception applies when the
second filer was the first to publicly disclose the invention within the
one-year, pre-filing grace period." A second exception exists when
the first inventor to file derived his invention from the second filer.
Under the latter scenario, a separate derivation proceeding is held to
determine whether the first filer in fact derived invention from the
second filer." This proceeding can be seen as analogous to the
interferences under the 1952 Act because it affords third parties the
ability to challenge the originality of a claimed patent. In other
words, an inventor is able to secure the patent if he publicly discloses
before the second inventor files. This characteristic makes the Leahy-
Smith Act analogous to the 1952 Act, mischaracterizing the Leahy-
Smith Act as a first-to-file system.
Despite that similarity, the Leahy-Smith Act does introduce a
grace period that did not exist under the 1952 Act." Accordingly, the
inventor's own disclosures and the subsequent third party disclosures
are exempted." The first inventor, then, has a grace period of one
year from the date of disclosure to allow time to file." Because this is,
in effect, an entirely new variable introduced through the Leahy-
Smith Act, it is unclear ai this time how it will affect patent
prosecution and patent litigation.
In sum, the first filer wins the patent except under three likely
scenarios. First, the first filer obtained the invention directly or
indirectly from the second filer. Within this scenario, a derivation
proceeding determines whether the first filer derived his invention,
and is the heir to interferences under the 1952 Act." Second, the first
filer abandons the application prior to publication or issuance. Third,
the second filer was first to publicly disclose the invention. This is the
most important exception because it represents the key change under
the new regime-it changes the United States' patent granting
procedure to a system that can be more accurately described as first
inventor to file.
31. Id.
32. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
33. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
34. 35 U.S.C. § 135.
35. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
36. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 135.
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A. Leahy-Smith Act Key Terms
The changes brought under the Leahy-Smith Act go beyond
wholesale additions. Along with introducing concepts such as the
grace period, the first-inventor-to-file system redefines familiar legal
doctrines." The definition of prior art in section 102(a) is now rooted
in the time of filing and has no geographic restrictions." Whereas the
1952 Act limited its geographic scope to the United States, the new
Act takes the whole world into consideration." In turn, these changes
yield progressive and forward-thinking benefits. First, it eliminates
uncertainty by placing the United States in line with the international
community, which favors a first-to-file regime. Accordingly, the new
Act is more responsive to prevailing trends in intellectual property
because it acknowledges the march towards globalization as devices,
such as iPhones and Android, are used beyond the United States'
borders. Viewed in this light, the Leahy-Smith Act can be seen as
working with, as opposed to against, the prevailing intellectual
property shift towards international harmonization.
Looking at the text of section 102(a) under the new Act is also
informative. It states that, for novelty and prior art, "a person shall
be entitled to a patent unless ... the claimed invention was patented,
described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or
otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention."4 2 In addition, the patent will not be granted if
"the claimed invention was described in a patent issued [to
another] ... or in [another's] application to patent published ... [that]
was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention."43 Thus, these portions of the text create five categories of
prior art in 102(a)(1) and a sixth category in 102(a)(2)." This
language is critical because it establishes the shift towards a first-
inventor-to-file system. At a fundamental level, it states that the
second filer cannot obtain a patent because the first filer's earlier
filing makes that application prior art relative to the second filer.
Moreover, that section also creates the abandonment exception-if
the first filer abandons his application prior to publication, then the
second filer can still get a patent.
39. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
40. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
41. Id.




Furthermore, section 102(a)(1) establishes five categories of
prior art: patents, printed publications, public uses, on sale material,
and otherwise available to the public. 45 This also illustrates some of
the changes between the 1952 Act and the Leahy-Smith Act. It
establishes that prior art is measured at the time of public disclosure
or filing, rather than conception; this highlights the key change under
a first-inventor-to-file regime. Additionally, geographic restrictions
are removed completely. All categories are global, including public
use and on sale.46 The phrase "otherwise available to the public" has
also been added, which seems analogous to the "known . . . by others"
language under the 1952 Act.47
Not everything in this section differs from the 1952 version. The
common-law definition of "printed publication" still applies,
although the addition of "otherwise available to the public" category
may make some cases easier. Importantly, "public use" is still a
category, and the interpretation set forth in the key precedents
remains good law. As stated in Metallizing Engineering Co. v.
Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., a secret, non-informing use is a
"public use" for evaluating any patent applications by the user, but it
is not for evaluating any applications by a third party.4 8 Therefore, a
non-informing use is a public'disclosure relative to the party engaging
in the non-informing use.4 9 However, according to W.L. Gore &
Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., that same use is not considered a
public disclosure to a third party.' Some may assert that the statute
overrules these cases so that the inventor's own secret commercial
exploitation will not bar that inventor from later seeking a patent.
That would reverse centuries of United States patent law, dating back
to the Supreme Court's decision in Pennock v. Dialogue." Such a
drastic and paradigm change seems unlikely under the new Act.
A few intuitive rationales support this view. First, it is a standard
canon of statutory construction that reenactment of statutory
language with a known legal meaning constitutes the known meaning.
Second, the entirety of a Senate colloquy focused on the grace
45. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
46. Id,
47. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
48. 153 F.2d 516, 519 (2d Cir. 1946).
49. Id.
50. 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
51. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 1 (1829).
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period.2 Within that context, only one sentence can be interpreted as
supporting the opposite view:
One of the implications of the point we are making is
that subsection 102(a) was drafted in part to do away
with precedent under current law that private offers
for sale or private uses or secret processes practiced in
the United States that result in a product or service
that is then made public may be deemed patent-
defeating prior art."
Still, even that sentence did not suggest congressional intent to
make that kind of paradigm shift in patent law regarding non-
informing uses. Third, Congress does not "hide elephants in
mouseholes." In other words, the canons of statutory interpretation
disfavor broad legislative change through discrete and seemingly
trivial actions. Fourth, remarks in legislative history are not the
statutory text. These types of comments are often unreliable because
the speakers could be focusing on a different issue, which is the case
here.
The exceptions and grace period are set forth in 102(b).' The
new language in section 102(b) has a simple structure because
paragraph (b)(1) provides all the exceptions to section 102(a)(1)
categories of prior art." Paragraph (b)(2) provides all the exceptions
to a first filed United States patent application under 102(a)(2).'
B. Illustrations of the Grace Period Exemption
The implications of the new grace period can be demonstrated
through examples rooted in the statute's text. For example, assume
that Andrew Alford publishes an article disclosing his invention in
June of 2015. In December 2015, he files for a patent. His June
disclosure is not part of the prior art under (b)(1)(A) because
Andrew was the source of disclosure. Continuing with this example,
assume that Barbara Askins stole Andrew's invention. Then,








Barbara placed Andrew's invention for sale. Andrew will be
protected under the new statute; since the disclosure came indirectly
from Andrew by way of Barbara's illicit activities, the disclosure will
be removed from the prior art through (b)(1)(A). If Barbara instead
attempted to file a patent that covers Andrew's invention, Andrew
would again be protected under (b)(2)(A). Since Barbara derived his
patent application from Andrew's work, the former's activities will
not bar the latter from obtaining the patent. In other words, if
Andrew files after Barbara under the given circumstances, Andrew
can still preserve priority through the section 102 grace period.
Section (b)(2)(B) also contains intuitive protections for first
inventors. Assume that inventor Charles Alderton publicly discloses
his invention in June of 2015. Then, he files for a patent in December
2015. In August 2015, Dan Hayes independently publishes his own
research that, in effect, is identical to Charles' work. Dan however
rushes to the USPTO and files for patent protection in September
2015. Charles is still protected, but this time under (b)(2)(B). Since
he disclosed before Dan's publication and filing, Charles is able to
preserve priority with his December application. Both of Dan's
activities are not included in the prior art relative to Charles, and
Charles is able to obtain the patent even though he was the second
filer. This, in turn, remains true to the text of the Constitution, which
states that patents should be granted to the first inventor.
The changes that result from these grace period considerations
underline the more subtle wrinkles caused by the Leahy-Smith Act.
Since a thumb is placed on the scale in favor of public disclosure, the
new Act creates an incentive to publish or risk obtaining weaker
grace period protection. Under the 1952 Act, a second filer could
obtain priority over a first filer by demonstrating that he conceived
the invention first. This process has been categorically removed
under the new Leahy-Smith Act. Instead, a second filer can secure
patent protection over the first filer by demonstrating that he
published behind the prior art. At this point, the significance of this
change is not clear, and without any actual litigation, its implications
are tentative at best.
However, one thing is certain: by favoring public disclosure over
conception, the new regime places an emphasis on certainty.
Conception, on the other hand, can take place in private and thus
does not require the same level of verification. Simply put, public
disclosure requires appreciation from a third party. Inversely, public
disclosures can also be seen as a major limit on the first-inventor-to-
file system because the second applicant, with an earlier public
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disclosure, can beat the first filer. Again, the new regime has not yet
been implemented, so at this point it is not clear how this will affect
patent law. But, the aforementioned considerations indicate that
there is room for interpretation with these categories of grace period
events, and thus there is room for significant complexity and
litigation. Where the disclosure in an applicant's early publication is
not identical to the disclosure in a later piece of prior art, the USPTO
and courts will need to decide what portion of the prior art gets
excluded because it had been disclosed previously in the applicant's
early publication. Nonetheless, the new system should be easier to
administer than interferences because the relevant dates for analysis
are more clearly defined.
C. Alternative Views Regarding the New Grace Period
Detractors may argue that the new statute's grace period offers
weak protections to inventors. For example, certain section 102(a)
prior art events cannot qualify for the grace period because the event
is not a "disclosure" within the meaning of the new section 102(b).
That view is not supported by the statute's text. It indicates that the
word "disclosure" in the new section 102(b)(1)(A) should be
interpreted broadly to encompass any activity that would generate
prior art under 102(a)(1).
This view is based on the text, structure and legislative history of
the statute. First, the statute's structure under section 102(b)(1)
specifically distinguishes between the inventor's activities that
constitute merely a "disclosure" in (b)(1)(A) and activities that
"publicly disclose" in (b)(1)(B). If the concept of disclosing were to
be defined as "publicly disclosing," then the word "publicly" in
(b)(1)(B) would be rendered superfluous. Section 102(b)(2) also
refers to "disclosures" appearing in patent applications." However,
filed patent applications do not publicly disclose material until
publication 18 months after filing. Second, some definitions of
"disclose" do not rise to the level of widespread dissemination. For
example, the dictionary provides one definition as "open to one's own
knowledge." While the legislative history contains some loose
language, there are unequivocal assurances that, within the one-year
grace period, an inventor's own activities should never create a
barrier for them obtaining a patent: "[grace periods] will apply to all
57. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2).
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actions by the patent owner during the year prior to filing that would
otherwise create section 102(a) prior art.""
The grace period in 102(b) is best interpreted as providing two
levels of protection. Stronger protection is provided under the "A"
subparagraphs in 102(b)(1) and 102(b)(2) so that, during the one-year
grace period, none of the inventor's own work can be the source of
prior art relative to the inventor." The key concept of "disclosure"
should be interpreted to mean disclosure into the prior art. Protection
is also provided against others' disclosures under the "B"
subparagraphs of 102(b)(1) and (2), but only if the inventor has
"publicly disclosed."60
D. Applications Under the New Novelty Requirement
Like section 102(b), the essence of the new 102(a) novelty
provision protects the interest of the first inventor. At its most basic
level, a publication by one inventor prior to a second inventor's filing
will stop the second inventor from obtaining the patent. For example,
Albert Einstein's public disclosure in January 2015 will block John
Smith's patent filing in March 2015. John's work will not satisfy the
novelty requirement as a result of Albert's publication. This would
hold true even if John had not derived his invention from Albert
because the statute does not provide an independent discovery
defense.
However, the protections offered to bona fide first inventors are
limited. If, for example, Thomas Edison enters into a confidential
sales agreement in January 2015, he then has until January 2016 to
file for patent protection. If he fails to do so, his January 2015
agreement will be rendered prior art against him under 102(b)(1).
This hypothetical gets trickier when a third party is introduced
into the equation. Assume that Edison files for patent protection in
March 2015. If Nikola Tesla publishes an article in February 2015
that covers the secret invention sold by Edison in January 2015, then
Tesla will have priority. If Tesla then applies for a patent in April
2015, Edison will not be able to cite his secret sale in January as a bar.
In other words, Edison's application will be rejected because it will
not be novel relative to Tesla's disclosure and filing in February and
April, respectively.
58. H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 43 (2011), http://judiciary.house.gov/issues/Patent
%20Reform%20PDFS/CRPT-112hrpt98-ptl.pdf.
59. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
60. Id.
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Building on this example, assume that Tesla files a patent
application in January 2016. That would mean that Tesla is a second
filer whose application was submitted a year after Edison's sales
agreement. Here, Edison's secret sale will not be considered prior art
relative to Tesla because they were not public disclosures. Tesla also
has the upper hand against Edison's filing because Tesla's public
disclosure precedes it under 102(b)(2)(B). So, Tesla will likely secure
the patent despite being the second filer.
HI. The Leahy-Smith Act is More in Line with the Spirit of the
Constitution and the Additional Patentability Requirements
In Fiers v. Revel, the court found an exception for simultaneous
conception and reduction to practice. In In re Application of
Hardee, the Patent Commissioner found that "one must contribute to
the conception to be an inventor."62 Likewise, in Board of Trustees of
Florida State University v. American Bioscience Inc., the court added
the following caveat: "invention requires conception." 63 In the case of
chemical compounds, the status of inventorship may only be granted
if the claimed inventor has a conception of the specific compounds
being asserted." In American Bioscience Inc., the Federal Circuit
held that simply having general knowledge of the anticipated
biological properties of groups of compounds is insufficient to grant
inventorship status. Similarly, in Ex parte Smernoff, the Patent
Board stated that, "one who suggests an idea of a result to be
accomplished, rather the means of accomplishing it, is not a
coinventor.""
These cases are often cited by the USPTO in determining
patentability. They indicate that the definition of inventor is not
static, but dynamic, as the agency looks to board and case law for its
guidelines. The fluidity of the definition is significant because it sets
the stage for the context in which the Leahy-Smith Act was signed
into law; it was enacted in the shadow of case law indicating that
patent rights are based on a fluid definition of inventor. At the most
basic level, this indicates that the definition of inventorship is not set
61. 984 F.2d 1164, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
62. 223 USPQ 1122, 1123 (Comm'r Pat. 1984).
63. 333 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 215 USPQ 545,547 (Bd. App. 1982).
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in stone as some scholars may argue. More importantly, there is more
to the intellectual property clause than the word "inventor." The text
of the clause indicates that the purpose is societal improvement by
promoting the progress of science. How can this purpose be achieved
if the old system allows an individual to stop others from obtaining a
patent without requiring him to get that information to the public? In
other words, the old system allows individuals to stop others from
moving the world forward because it puts a premium on activities that
can be done privately. Of course, invention does require diligent
work performed away from the eyes of the public. However, placing
the critical dates for patentability on private activity is less in line with
the spirit of the intellectual property clause because public disclosure
and filing necessarily bring information to the world.
In Fritsh v. Lin, even though the inventor was not involved in
developing the procedures for expressing the gene in question in host
cells, he was granted the patent.7 In that case, the Patent Board
determined that "it is not essential for the inventor to be personally
involved in carrying out process steps where implementation of those
steps require the exercise of inventive skill."' Furthermore, it was
deemed that there is no requirement an inventor be the party who
reduces the invention to practice. What matters is whether the
reduction was done on his behalf.9 This notion is further elaborated
in Mattor v. Coolegem, in which the Board stated, "one following oral
instructions is viewed as merely a technician.""
These cases further indicate that the law is sensitive to the notion
of defining an inventor within the reality that inventions often come
to fruition with the input of several individuals. Additionally, the
distinction between technicians and inventors illustrates the premium
placed on originality and inventive skill. The Leahy-Smith Act is
consistent with this notion. While public disclosure and filing under
the new regime takes precedent over the subjective mindset of the
inventor, the Act leaves the door open for the original inventor to
demonstrate that the patent holder derived the invention from him.
If such a showing is made, the original inventor may invalidate the
patent even though the holder was the first to file. As a result, the
Act continues this nation's tradition of placing a premium on
inventive skill.
67. 21 USPQ2d 1737, 1739 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1991).
68. Id.
69. In re DeBaun, 687 F.2d 459,463 (CCPA 1982).
70. 530 F.2d 1391, 1395 (CCPA 1976).
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Under the 1952 Act, the stages of invention include conception
and reduction to practice, followed by filing in order to obtain formal
protection. The new Leahy-Smith Act instead focuses on public
disclosure while still requiring filing. The latter thus shifts the weight
of focus on activities that bring information to the public. Under the
old act, an inventor could simply conceive of an invention, obtain a
patent, but then put it in his drawer. The whole point of the
intellectual property clause is to move the world forward, and yet that
inventor is allowed to just sit on his patent. This is why the new focus
on filing and public disclosure is not only constitutional, but
preferable. Public disclosure and filing actually moves the world
forward in a way that is true to the spirit of the intellectual property
clause and the Constitution because they bring information out to the
public.
Patent eligibility, however, goes beyond the section 102
requirements. For example, the purpose of the written description
requirement is "to ensure that the inventor had possession, as of the
filing date of the application relied on, of the specific subject matter
later claimed by him."" Furthermore, the written description must be
sufficient, when the entire specification is considered, such that the
"necessary and only reasonable construction" that would be given it
by a person skilled in the art is one that clearly supports each positive
limitation in the count." An example of this is seen again in Hyatt v.
Boone." There, the claim could be read as describing subject matter
other than that of the count and thus did not establish that the
applicant was in possession of the invention of the count." In Bigham
v. Godtfredsen, there is a similar understanding: "[t]he generic term
halogen comprehends a limited number of species, and ordinarily
constitutes a sufficient written description of the common halogen
species.""
The enablement requirement again highlights the premium that
has historically been placed on informing the public. In order for a
patent application to provide a sufficient written description, it must
inform third parties to the extent necessary for duplication of the
invention. So, it looks beyond the inventor himself and asks if his
work is moving the world forward. The first-inventor-to-file regime
71. In re Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349, 1352 (CCPA 1978).
72. Id.
73. 146 F.3d 1348, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
74. Id.
75. 857 F.2d 1415, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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speaks to the same essence. Under a first-to-invent system, the
moment of invention is more subjective because conception and
reduction to practice can be done privately. However, under a first-
inventor-to-file system, this analysis becomes clearer. The patent is
granted to the first inventor that files or is first to publicly disclose.
Third parties are introduced into the equation and can validate or
discredit the relevant key dates that the patent system is looking to.
This public record, in turn, brings additional benefits to the
patent system. In the first instance, it puts any potential independent
inventors on notice that a particular invention has been covered.
Once they are put on notice, one of two outcomes is likely. First, the
second-in-time inventor is informed that a patent already exists in the
area he is pursuing invention. So, he is likely to stop developing that
particular invention. Society is no worse off because identical
inventions, even those developed independently, provide no benefit.
The individual inventor is better off because he is clearly informed
that his efforts should be redirected. Alternatively, if the second-in-
time filer knows that the patent holder derived his invention from his
work, the second-in-time filer may bring proceedings against the
patent owner to invalidate the patent. In either scenario, the
outcome is more stable because of the clarity provided by a first-
inventor-to-file system.
Support for a first-inventor-to-file system can be found beyond
the enablement and written description requirements as well. The
Eaton v. Evans court stated that "in an interference proceeding, a
party seeking to establish an actual reduction to practice must satisfy
a two-prong test: (1) the party [must construct] an embodiment or
perform[] a process that met every element of the interference count,
and (2) the embodiment or process [must operate] for its intended
purpose."76 In Wetmore v. Quick, the Federal Circuit reiterated that
constructive reduction to practice and actual reduction to practice are
not identical.77 The court noted that, "the same evidence sufficient
for a constructive reduction to practice may be insufficient to
establish an actual reduction to practice, which requires a showing of
the invention in a physical or tangible form that shows every element
of the count."8 For an actual reduction to practice, the invention
must have been sufficiently tested to demonstrate that it will work for
76. 204 F.3d 1094, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2000).




its intended purpose, but it does not need to be in a commercially
satisfactory stage of development."
Each of the cases reflects the reality that it is unclear to
determine whether an invention is ready for real-world use. A first-
to-invent system further adds to this confusion. In order to verify
whether the invention was indeed completed at the time claimed, the
inventor must reconstruct the steps he took. This adds another layer
of uncertainty because an ex post evidentiary analysis is often needed.
Under a first-inventor-to-file system, an ex post evidentiary analysis
will occur less often because the dates are clearer. This, in turn,
speeds up the entire process because it favors these types of
evidentiary hearings only when an original inventor attempts to
invalidate a patent.
IV. Constitutional Case Law Supports a
First-Inventor-to-File Regime
Supreme Court decisions are particularly relevant because patent
law is federal. Their line of cases support the assertion that Congress
was within its authority to grant patent rights in the method
proscribed by the Leahy-Smith Act. For our purposes, the focus is on
"inventor" because the shift from a first-to-invent regime to a first
inventor to file turns largely on this word. As discussed, the former
relies on conception and reduction to practice whereas the latter
depends on public disclosure and filing.
79. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL
OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (8th ed. 2001) (Rev. July 2010). Several cases
exemplify this idea: Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1062, 32 USPQ2d 1115, 1118-19 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (citing numerous cases wherein the character of the testing necessary to support
an actual reduction to practice varied with the complexity of the invention and the
problem it solved). If a device is so simple, and its purpose and efficacy so obvious,
construction alone is sufficient to demonstrate workability. King Instrument Corp. v.
Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860, 226 USPQ 402, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Additional cases
pertaining to the requirements necessary to establish actual reduction: DSL Dynamic
Sciences, Ltd. v. Union Switch & Signal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1122, 1126,18 USPQ2d 1152, 1155
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (events occurring after an alleged actual reduction to practice can call into
question whether reduction to practice has in fact occurred); Fitzgerald v. Arbib, 268 F.2d
763, 765-66, 122 USPQ 530, 531-32 (CCPA 1959) ("the reduction to practice of a three-
dimensional design invention requires the production of an article embodying that design"
in "other than a mere drawing); Birmingham v. Randall, 171 F.2d 957, 80 USPQ 371, 372
(CCPA 1948) (To establish an actual reduction to practice of an invention directed to a
method of making a product, it is not enough to show that the method was performed.
[Sluch an invention is not reduced to practice until it is established that the product made
by the process is satisfactory, and this may require successful testing of the product.)
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A survey of Supreme Court decisions regarding the intellectual
property clause and the definition of inventor supports the stated
proposition. In 1850, the Court stated in Gayler v. Wilder that "the
inventor of a new and useful improvement certainly has no exclusive
right to it, until he obtains a patent. The right is created by the
patent, and no suit can be maintained by the inventor against any one
for using it before the patent is issued."'a Expanding on this notion,
the Court stated that, "the discoverer of a new and useful
improvement is vested by law with an inchoate right to its exclusive
use, which he may perfect and make absolute by proceeding in the
manner which the law requires."8 1
These cases exemplify the issue of the Leahy-Smith Act's
constitutional viability. The Court recognized that the inventor's
right vests at the point in time at which the patent is granted. More
importantly, it recognized that the patent right perfects the rights
created by inventorship. Thus, it treats the two as distinct. The
opposing view argues that inventorship itself vests the right.
However, as seen in this early decision, the Supreme Court's
precedent does not treat the two as one in the same. In other words,
the two key dates taken into consideration by the Leahy-Smith Act,
public disclosure and filing, is analogous to the approach seen since
1850. Equally important here is the basic recognition that the
legislative branch determines how the right is granted. Congress'
enactment of the Leahy-Smith Act fits in perfectly with this rationale.
As the legislature, Congress has prescribed by law the method by
which the patent right is granted.
During this same time period, the Court stated in Evans v. Eaton
that, "no valid patent can be granted [when the second inventor]
cannot be considered as the original inventor. . .. "' The plaintiff in
that case argued that he should be granted patent rights for his
improvements to an earlier invention.' The device in question
"spreads and turns the meal, cools it some, dries it, and gathers it to
the bolting chest."" The Court elaborated: "a patent ... can only be
for an original invention. It is of no importance that a man really
believes himself to be the inventor, or is the true inventor ... without
knowledge that the thing he supposes himself to have invented was
80. 51 U.S. 477, 493 (1850).
81. Id.
82. 20 U.S. 356, 361 (1822).
83. Id. at 357.
84. Id.
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known or used before."" Furthermore, the Court stated, "as a patent
for the whole machine, including the alleged improvements, it is void
because the plaintiff was not the original inventor of the machine." 9
Again, during this early period, the analysis turns on whether the
inventor was in fact the first person to move the world forward with
his work. This analysis can translate seamlessly to the current system
introduced by the Leahy-Smith Act. Under a first-inventor-to-file
system, a secondary inventor's application can be rejected because
the law has recognized those rights in the original inventor. The only
difference would be the point in time when the original inventor's
rights vested in a patent. Under the new regime, the first to file or
publicly disclose would have his rights secured. Thus, he would be
the original inventor. The second-in-time inventor would still be
blocked from a patent because those rights would have already
vested. Therefore, the change from a first-to-invent to a first-
inventor-to-file regime would not significantly conflict with the
constitutional rationale dating back to the 1820s.
This argument is bolstered by the Court's deference to the Patent
Act of 1793.8 The Court recognizes that the validity of patents and
their assignment to the inventor derives from congressional
legislation.8 The Court has sidestepped lower court interpretations of
the Patent Act of 1793 and deferred to the congressional text." This
reinforces the notion that the Court favors deference to the legislative
branch in deciding these manners. In addition, this decision carries
considerable weight in interpreting the intellectual property clause
given the early time period in which it was made. Because this case
was decided within the Founding Generation, its implications are
further cemented as precedent. Accordingly, the Leahy-Smith Act is
in line with this reasoning. Neither constitutional text nor early
constitutional case law disfavors Congress from making these kinds of
decisions. Rather, the language and deference seen here indicate that
Congress is well within their realm of authority to define the word
"inventor" and set the framework for granting patent rights.
In 1824, the Supreme Court examined the extent of
congressional authority in the landmark decision of Gibbons v.
85. Id. at 379.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 429.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 435.
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Ogden.0 While this case is taught nationwide for its implications on
interstate commerce, it is also an early examination of the intellectual
property clause that yielded a nuanced approach to Congress'
capacity to legislate in that area. The Court stated that, while
Congress may grant patent rights to inventors through Article I, this
source for granting patent rights was not necessarily exclusive.9 ' The
Court stated that other forms and levels of government may grant
patent rights so long as they do not conflict with the intellectual
property clause.' Conversely, "[the intellectual property clause]
excludes all rights to legislate for the benefit of any person who is not
himself the inventor."
Most importantly, the Court accepts the legislative definition of
"inventor" even though the case in effect limits congressional
authority. By establishing these extensions and limitations, the Court
demonstrated that it was taking more than a perfunctory look at
Congress' power under the intellectual property clause. Within this
framing, the Court elected to accept Congress' definition of
inventorship. Thus, the Court, at least implicitly, acknowledges that
Congress may statutorily define that term, which is exactly what
Congress has done with the Leahy-Smith Act. They defined a term
that is within their realm of authority.
Within the context of the Court defining and shaping Congress'
authority under the intellectual property clause, some boundaries
have been set. As one of the most cited decisions in this field,
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City states these boundaries
most clearly." There, the Court stated that, "Congress may not
authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to
materials already available."4 This conclusion was based on the
rationale that "innovation, advancement, and things which add to the
sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system
which by constitutional command must 'promote the Progress of
useful Arts."'9 In unequivocal terms, the Court stated that, "this is
the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.
90. 22 U.S. 1, 9 (1824).
91. Id. at 45.
92. Id.




And it is in this light that patent validity 'requires reference to a
standard written into the Constitution.'"
The importance of this precedent is relevant for a variety of
reasons. First, it again highlights that Congress is not unbound in
granting patent rights. Second, it reaffirms the notion that all
authority in granting these rights must stem from the Constitution. In
the first instance, the Leahy-Smith Act does not encounter any
insurmountable constitutional challenges. The text of the Act does
not remove knowledge from the public domain. Once the original
patent is granted to the first inventor to file, that information is no
longer in the public domain. Therefore, a second applicant who
claims to have developed the invention prior to the first inventor to
file is put on notice. The burden is placed on inventors to remain
vigilant in monitoring similar patent applications that may cover their
invention. In the second instance, the Leahy-Smith Act derives its
authority from the Constitution. As stated previously, Congress has
the power to grant patents to inventors. And, as demonstrated by the
relevant case law, this power includes statutorily defining terms,
which is exactly what Congress has done in the Leahy-Smith Act.
Since the Act does not remove information from the public domain
and it derives its authority from the Constitution, it does not
encounter insurmountable constitutional challenges based on the
landmark case law.
This interpretation is also consistent with congressional
legislation from that period. According to the Bayh-Dole Act,
"whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore."" This statute
supports the constitutionality of the Leahy-Smith Act in two ways.
First, it demonstrates that the Leahy-Smith Act is consistent with the
preceding patent legislation. Like the Bayh-Dole Act, the Leahy-
Smith Act allows patent rights to be granted to an inventor for his
inventions. Again, the only distinction is the point in time in which
those rights are granted. Second, the Bayh-Dole Act indicates that
Congress has a history of legislating in this field, which lends
credibility to the notion that Congress is within their authority to
legislate in the manner detailed by the Leahy-Smith Act.
The new regime set forth in the Leahy-Smith Act does not
authorize patent rights to be vested in individuals who are not the
96. Id.
97. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
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inventor. It does not allow granting of more than one patent covering
the same area. It also does not allow granting of patent rights on
naturally occurring substances. Therefore, the only meaningful
change it ushers in is the point in time in which the rights are granted.
Since this is consistent with Congress' legislative history in the field,
the change to a first-inventor-to-file regime is constitutional.
Conclusion
The text of the Constitution does not limit Congress' ability to
shape the method by which patents are issued. Various Supreme
Court decisions have set boundaries on Congress' power in this area.
A first-inventor-to-file system is not outside of these boundaries.
Because - of these considerations, the Leahy-Smith Act is
constitutional. Equally important are the policy considerations in
favor of the regime set forth in the Leahy-Smith Act. The Act
establishes clear guidelines for when patent rights are created. It also
facilitates the patent process by establishing a framework designed to
eliminate unnecessary evidentiary claims. On an international level,
it places the United States' system in harmony with the majority of
the nations with whom we trade. From a practical standpoint, this
system is also in line with the cases used by the USPTO in
establishing its guidelines for determining patentability. As a result,
not only is the first-inventorto-file regime in the Leahy-Smith Act
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